

Fuelled by LNG

SIEM
Car Carriers

SIEM CONFUCIUS

Pure Car Truck Carrier (PCTC) Fires – Application of Current Knowledge and Next Steps


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Classification: PUBLIC



General point of view

- Mixing topics should be avoided- cars on PCTC are not Li-Ion cells on heating plates, RoRo is not Container
- Discussions should be precise regarding source, scenario and solution (tactic)- “EV on fire” means car or battery or both
- “Red herrings” should be identified and unmasked- no known case of “overcharging”, mechanical damage turns to “vibration”

- ✓ EVs do not present a higher risk regarding likelihood or scenario
- ✓ All traditional methods of firefighting are effective
- ✓ It is not necessary to stop the thermal runaway
- ✓ On PCTC “**fixed first**” should be the preferred tactic
-  Design, resources and equipment must be taken into account

Current knowledge

All traditional methods are effective regardless the drive trains

- Fixed CO2 system successfully tested by Volkswagen Konzernlogistik (not published) ✓
- Drencher system successfully tested by LASHFIRE (published) ✓
- Foam system successfully tested by Kashiwa Tech (published, IMO SSE9-Inf.4)
- Manual firefighting successfully tested by e.g. LASHFIRE, IBK (Germany)...



Grande California
✓
...
✓

BUT:

Design, resources, equipment and circumstances have to be taken into account

- Design: e.g. Fire zones (resistance of divisions), fixed system and response ways
- Resources: e.g. number of crew and level of training/knowledge (fixed system and general)
- Equipment: e.g. firemen suits and number of BA
- Circumstances: e.g. nighttime, middle of NA, 6m waves and deck with lashed cargo

Response time is more important than the drivetrain

Detection and confirmation should be immediately and simultaneously

Crews must be aware of vessel's resources and limitations

... and some more work to do...

Next steps

Short term actions:

- Stop “laissez - faire” (“...ah, you know how it’s in practice”) regarding attitude, maintenance, training...
- “Individual risk assessments” and tactics for each single vessel
- Fleet campaigns (information and best practice)

Medium/long term actions:

- Improvements on “Port of Refuge” process
- Improvements on sea/shore cooperation (firefighting)
- International regulation for Maritime Fire Assistance (shore support - analogous medical assistance?)
- Holistic approach on emergency response regarding design, resources, equipment and training
- Scientific approach and support regarding regulations
- Design/construction: back up system, “safe island”, response ways, safe return to port for PCTC ?...?...?

| RISK ASSESSMENT FORM | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|---|--------|--|--|------------------------|---|----|--------|
| Company: | | Task Category: ALU / SAFETY | | Work Activity: Fire/ Cargo Deck 9 | | Code: XX-242 | | Version: 1 | | | |
| Vessel Name: | | Risk Category: ALU / SAFETY | | Work Activity: Fire/ Cargo Deck 9 | | Issue Date: ADP | | | | | |
| Risk Assessment Conditions | | Important Instructions | | Analysis of aggressions used to calculate Risk | | Risk Rating | | LIKELIHOOD (L) | | | |
| Work Authorization Work has been authorized: <input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N | | Work Activity is high risk: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO | | (5) Severity (L) Likelihood Risk Rating | | Risk Rating | | 1 2 3 4 5 | | | |
| No Fatigue Staff fit to perform PPE: <input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N | | Relevant SMS sections: | | 1 Negligible 2 Minor 3 Moderate 4 Critical 5 Catastrophic | | L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 | | 1 2 3 4 5 | | | |
| Use of proper PPE Staff fit to wear PPE: <input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N | | See relevant SMS Sections | | 6 Severe 7 Major 8 Critical 9 Catastrophic | | M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 | | 1 2 3 4 5 | | | |
| Experienced staff Staff has same experience: <input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N | | Relevant SMS Form(s) to be used: | | 10 Catastrophic 11 High 12 Medium 13 Low 14 Very Low | | S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 | | 1 2 3 4 5 | | | |
| | | Repeat Form to be used: | | How to Assess Risk: Select Severity expression that applies to hazard with NO controls | | | | | | | |
| | | | | Select appropriate likelihood with NO Controls | | | | | | | |
| | | | | Select appropriate likelihood with NO Controls | | | | | | | |
| | | | | Apply controls and RECALCULATE risk. | | | | | | | |
| HAZARD DESCRIPTION (Assume NO CONTROLS to identify areas at risk) | | Risk Rating (S/L/T/SE) | | Risk (L/M/H) | | CONTROL MEASURES TO BE TAKEN (To Reduce the Risk and calculate the residual/FINAL Risk Rating) | | Risk Rating (S/L/T/SE) | | | |
| No | | S | L | T | SE | | | S | L | T | SE |
| 1 | Site Unattended / Unattended Operations | 5 | 3 | 15 | High | Check for visitors or missing persons, determine location and try to isolate fire, evacuate unnecessary personnel from the area, fire check, if an adjacent vessel get signal to isolate fire draft | | 5 | 3 | 15 | High |
| 2 | Inadequate communication | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium | Clear instructions, established communication with Emergency and Support vessels, require assistance if necessary. See checklist | | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium |
| 3 | Delays in crew alert / confusion | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium | Master stations, alert vessels in vicinity, alert coastal stations, notify the Office and take action accordingly. Prepare for further alerting if necessary. See checklist | | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium |
| 4 | Delay in deployment of PPE / PPE equipment | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium | Documented procedures / familiarization / drills and training / checklist for fire. | | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium |
| 5 | Crew not competent to hand handle | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium | Take photos, collect evidence, follow Company's procedure, alert Emergency Response Team and ask for advice, confirm checked follow Company's procedure, alert Emergency Response Team and ask for advice if necessary and situation is getting worse. See checklist | | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium |
| 6 | Unattended equipment / Unattended failure | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium | Fire checklist, proper bridge equipment / OROSC maintenance and tests as per Company's procedures | | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium |
| 7 | Incorrect incident handling / communication failure | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium | Documented procedures / familiarization / drills and training / routine operational equipment checks | | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium |
| 8 | Incorrect incident handling / communication failure | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium | Back up of VDR/VDR data, documented procedures and instructions, official log books / File | | 3 | 3 | 9 | Medium |
| 9 | Incorrect incident handling / communication failure | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium | Check of essential items supply (cargo hold illumination) | | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium |
| 10 | Incorrect incident handling / communication failure | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium | Check of essential items supply (cargo hold illumination) | | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium |
| 11 | Incorrect incident handling / communication failure | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium | Check of essential items supply (cargo hold illumination) | | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium |
| 12 | Incorrect incident handling / communication failure | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium | Check of essential items supply (cargo hold illumination) | | 4 | 3 | 12 | Medium |
| Further Actions to control residual risk | | Action Due Date | | Completion Date | | Date | | Prepared/Reviewed By: | | | |
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... in less than 10min??? ...



... in less than 10min!!! ...